The Punjab government, brushing aside Sindh’s longstanding objections, has begun test operations of the controversial Jalalpur Canal. Originating from the right bank of Rasool Barrage on the Jhelum River, the 117-kilometer canal, together with an extensive network of distributaries and minors, is designed to irrigate about 170,000 acres in Khushab, Pind Dadan Khan, and Pindi Gheb in Punjab’s Pothohar region.

The project, supported by financing from the Asian Development Bank, aims to convert predominantly rain-fed agriculture into irrigated farming in the aforementioned areas. The Punjab claims that the canal will draw water within Punjab’s share of water allocated under the 1991 Water Accord. Sindh argues that Punjab has already fully allocated its share under the 1991 Accord among its existing canals. If the Jalalpur Canal is to receive additional water, Punjab should clearly identify which existing canal will receive less water.

Since all existing canals already irrigate established command areas, the inevitable question is: where will those farmers obtain their water? The project’s PC-I provides no convincing answer. Sindh fears that any shortages created in the Jhelum system will ultimately be compensated through increased operation of the two controversial link canals, transferring water from the Indus to the Jhelum-Chenab zone. This will eventually reduce water available to Sindh.

The project’s water allowance has also raised concerns. According to the PC-I, the Jalalpur Canal has been designed with a water allowance of 6.75 cusecs per thousand acres, nearly two-and-a-half times higher than the 2.75 cusecs allocated to Sindh’s canals. Equally significant is the canal’s operating period from April to October. April and May are the months of acute early Kharif water shortages in the Indus system, when the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) routinely distributes water under shortage formulas rather than according to the 1991 Accord.

During this period, Punjab also operates its link canals and stores water in Mangla Dam. This year was no exception. Even as Kotri Barrage experienced shortages of nearly 60 percent in June, Punjab continued operating link canals and also kept filling Mangla Dam. Diverting another 1,350-cusec canal during this critical period will only worsen downstream shortages. Punjab advanced a similar argument during the Cholistan Canal project, asserting that the canal would operate within its allocated share. Sindh then asked the same fundamental question it asks today: if there is no surplus water in the system, where will the additional water come from?

IRSA issued a no-objection certificate for the Jalalpur canal by stating that it would operate within Punjab’s allocated share, but without adequately addressing Sindh’s concerns. On that basis, the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC ) approved the project despite Sindh’s opposition. This has further eroded IRSA’s credibility in Sindh.

Sindh maintains that Pakistan’s river system experiences chronic shortages for much of the year and that constructing new upstream canals without demonstrating the availability of surplus water undermines the spirit of the 1991 Water Apportionment Accord.

IRSA has been routinely declaring water shortages in April and distributing water under a three-tier shortage formula instead of the Accord’s allocations. If shortages already exist, Sindh argues, no institution has explained how water can be supplied to new canals without affecting existing users.

Now that the Jalalpur canal has been completed, irrigation over its command area will soon become a practical necessity. In dry years, the Punjab government will find it politically difficult to deny water to thousands of farmers dependent on the new canal. Sindh fears that this pressure will inevitably increase diversions through link canals, leaving downstream users to bear the consequences. Sindh formally opposed the project throughout its approval process.

Naseer Memon is an author and an expert in the water sector.