On July 30 this year Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi revived the long-standing proposal for creating new provinces, arguing that the country’s existing administrative system had collapsed and required restructuring. Soon afterward, Talal Chaudhry echoed Naqvi’s position, advocating the creation of new provinces in Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa – but not in Punjab.

These remarks came just days after one of Pakistan’s leading English-language news outlets published an editorial on July 27 endorsing the idea of new provinces. The editorial focused primarily on carving Karachi out of Sindh as a separate administrative unit.

Pakistan’s mainstream media has long been viewed as aligning itself with policies that critics describe as authoritarian, often at the expense of amplifying the voices of historically marginalized Sindhis, Baloch, and Pashtuns.

Nonetheless, these statements are far from unprecedented. Whenever Islamabad has struggled to defend the failure of its policies, it has often revived the rhetoric of creating new provinces to divert public attention from more pressing issues.

This time, the government has failed to answer the concerns raised by the people of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Nor is it only Kashmiris who have long sought answers. Sindhis, Baloch, and Pashtuns have also continued to raise questions about the state’s policies and governance.

Why, then, does the call for new provinces resurface at politically sensitive moments? What explains Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi’s remarks at such a critical time?

If government officials argue that the existing system has “collapsed,” are they suggesting that the federation itself is no longer workable? Even if the administrative system requires reform, that alone does not justify dividing Sindh, Balochistan, or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Among these provinces, Sindh has long occupied a central place in Islamabad’s proposals for territorial reorganization.

Is this the first time such an idea has been advanced? No. Far from it.

To understand why proposals to separate parts of Sindh have repeatedly resurfaced, it is essential to examine the historical record. Viewed through that lens, it becomes clear that efforts to alter Sindh’s territorial boundaries have remained on the Pakistani establishment’s agenda since the country’s creation.

Sindh has long borne the consequences of policies that Sindhis consider discriminatory. In Pakistan’s early years, the University of Sindh was relocated from Karachi to Jam Shoro, while the University of Karachi was established in the city. No other province experienced a comparable restructuring of its premier public university.

During the years of late Liaquat Ali Khan, more than 1,000 Sindhi-medium schools in Karachi were reportedly closed, further fueling concerns among Sindhis about the erosion of their language and cultural identity. Despite strong opposition from Sindhis, Karachi was designated the federal capital, while state policies steadily marginalized the Sindhi language, treating it as an outsider in its own historic city.

These developments did not occur in isolation. They formed part of a broader historical trajectory that Sindhis view as laying the groundwork for recurring proposals to separate Karachi from Sindh.

The pattern became even more pronounced under the military rule of Field Marshal Ayub Khan. His government imposed the One-Unit scheme, one of the most controversial political experiments in Pakistan’s history. Officially, the policy was presented as an administrative reform on the grounds that governing multiple provinces was impractical.

It sought to centralize power, weaken the political influence of the country’s federating units, and counterbalance the demographic majority of East Bengal. Although the One-Unit system was abolished in 1970, its underlying logic never disappeared. Its centralizing approach has continued to shape policies toward Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while Punjab has remained largely unaffected.

Whatever suits Islamabad’s political narrative is encouraged. Yesterday, it was the One Unit; today, it is the call for more provinces.

This raises serious questions about the 1940 agreement, under which Sindh and the other states joined Pakistan with the understanding that their status and historical identity would remain intact. Ironically, the spirit of that agreement was lost after East Bengal chose a separate path and became Bangladesh in 1971.

After Bangladesh’s separation, Sindhis, Baloch, and Pashtuns gave Islamabad another opportunity to preserve the federation by accepting the continued existence of the other provinces in their historical form. Yet the establishment – whose power is largely concentrated in Punjab – continued to pursue policies that, according to its critics, have benefited Punjab at the expense of the other three provinces and their natural resources.

The proposal to create new provinces is a clear violation of the spirit of the 1940 agreement. Pakistan is a federal state built upon four provinces. If Islamabad believes the system has collapsed and can no longer function, that is the failure of those who rule—not of Sindh, Balochistan, or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which have continued to support the federation.

If Islamabad intends to revive the One-Unit under a new strategy – the creation of new provinces – it would, in effect, seek to erase the culture, identity, history, and existence of Sindhis, Baloch, and Pashtuns. No one will allow that to happen. Islamabad should never forget what happened in the past. Sindh can survive on its own; the real question is whether Pakistan can survive.

New provinces are not the solution; they are the problem. One day, that problem could erupt with consequences that consume everything.